Antitrust Damages and Economic Efficiency:
An Approach to Antitrust Injury
William H. Paget
Three years ago, the Supreme Court enunciated the concept of
"antitrust injury, ' which requires that antitrust-damage liability
flow from the anticompetitive aspect of an unlawful practice. Since
then, the concept has often been raised in litigation, and has
sparked frequent judicial discussion.2 Courts and commentators,
however, have developed no coherent theory to guide the application of the antitrust-injury doctrine in the award of damages for
antitrust violations. This article will attempt to provide such a theory:3 it argues that the familiar criterion of economic efficiency
gives content to the concept of antitrust injury, and therefore can
be used to shape the award of antitrust damages.
I.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANTITRUST INJURY

The expansion of substantive antitrust liability by the Warren
Court and the simultaneous relaxation of procedural constraints on
the private treble-damage action created distortions in federal
antitrust policy. 4 Antitrust decisions then seemed to protect competitors and distributors from "unfair" treatment in their commercial dealings rather than to improve competition and reduce prices.
At the same time, partly as a result of a series of procedural decisions by the Supreme Court,5 the private plaintiff had become the
t Associate Professor of Law, Boston University. I would like to thank Professors Kenneth W. Dam and Richard A. Posner of the University of Chicago Law School, Professors
Joseph F. Brodley and John Leubsdorf of Boston University School of Law, and Robert H.
McGuckin of the United States Department of Justice for helpful comments on earlier
drafts.
I Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
See text at note 22 infra.
My approach here owes a good deal to the insights of Professor Areeda. See 2 P.
AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW T 333-349 (1978).
4 Dam, FortnerEnterprisesv. United States Steel: "Neithera Borrower, Nor a Lender
Be," 1969 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 36-40. See also Landes & Posner, The Private Enforcement of
Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 41 (1975).
" E.g., Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968) (eliminating in pari delicto as a complete defense); Poller v. CBS, Inc., 368 U.S. 464 (1962) (rais-
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most important agent of enforcement The significance of this development was clear: every nominal violation that held out the
prospect of treble damages would be challenged regardless of its
effects on competition. Such antitrust enforcement harmed consumers by encouraging inefficient business relationships and inhibiting aggressive competition.
Under the Burger Court, however, we have begun to witness a
countervailing trend. The substantive law, although retaining
many liberal rules of liability,6 now recognizes that the predominant goal of antitrust enforcement is the enhancement of competition rather than the subsidization of small and inefficient businesses.7 More importantly for our purposes here, the procedural
law has also begun to recognize the same goal by imposing limits
on the kinds of injuries for which private plaintiffs may recover.
The Supreme Court has recently articulated a principle that
explicitly recognizes the potential conflict between the damage
remedy and the goal of the antitrust laws. In Brunswick Corp. v.
Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.," following a perceptive analysis by Professor Areeda of the appellate decision in the same case, 9 the Court
interpreted the language in section 4 of the Clayton Act 0 that permits recovery for "anything forbidden by the antitrust laws" to refer to the anticompetitive aspects of a violation rather than the
violation itself.1 1 Brunswick, the nation's largest producer of equipment for bowling centers, acquired bowling centers owned by several of its defaulting customers; Brunswick continued to operate
the acquired centers in competition with the plaintiffs.1 2 In a suit
ing standards for summary judgment); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke
Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961) (per curiam) (eliminating the requirement that the plaintiff prove
public injury in per se cases).
6 E.g., United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429 U.S. 610 (1977) (narrowly defining the economic power required to prove an illegal tying arrangement).
7 See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 53 n.21 (1977).
8 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
9 Areeda, Antitrust Violations Without Damage Recoveries, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1127
(1976).
10 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
2 429 U.S. at 488.
12During a six-year boom in the popularity of bowling following the introduction of
automatic pinsetters in 1956, Brunswick's sales to bowling centers increased dramatically,
most of the sales were financed by Brunswick itself. Id. at 479; Brief for Petitioner at 6. In
1962, however, sales of new equipment fell by one-half and continued to decline until the
early 1970s. Id. at 7 n.5. Many of Brunswick's customers defaulted. The company began
repossessing the equipment, and, when it was unable to resell it, managing the centers
through its Bowling Center Operations Division. 429 U.S. at 478-80. By the time the suit
was originally filed in 1966, Brunswick was the largest national chain of bowling centers
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alleging violations of section 7 of the Clayton Act,13 the plaintiffs
claimed as damages the profits they would have gained had Brunswick not continued to operate the defaulting centers. 4 The court
of appeals ruled that if the acquisition were found to be illegal
under a proper instruction, 5 any injury causally related to the
presence of Brunswick in the market would be recoverable as damages, whether or not the injury resulted from a lessening of
competition.1 6
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion by Justice Marshall, vacated the appellate court's decision, and ordered entry of
judgment for Brunswick notwithstanding the verdict on the damage issue.' 7 Justice Marshall distinguished the substantive prohibition, which requires only an incipient or potential effect on competition, and the damage provision, which requires proof of actual
injury. "Plainly," he wrote, "to recover damages respondents must
prove more than that petitioner violated § 7, since such proof es-

with over five times as many centers as its next largest competitor. Id. at 480.
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
" After one mistrial, the case finally went to the jury in 1973. The jury was instructed
that "any percentage of the market achieved by Brunswick . . .beyond an insubstantial
amount, say beyond 10 to 15%, may be sufficient for you to conclude that competition has
substantially been lessened." Record at 4727, reprintedin Petition for Certiorari (Appendix
A), at A1499-500. As to the amount, it was instructed to include "all damages suffered by
the plaintiffs because of lost profits; that is to say, profits that the plaintiff would have made
if Brunswick has not violated the antitrust laws." Id. at 4733, reprinted in Petition for
Certiorari (Appendix A), at A1503. The court further charged that damages for the violation
should be within the range offered by plaintiff's experts. Id. at 4736-42, reprinted in Petition for Certiorari (Appendix A), at A1505-09. The jury returned a verdict equal to the
lowest estimate of the plaintiff's experts, and after a remittitur as to damages for one of the
bowling centers, the court entered judgment. Treadway Cos. v. Brunswick, 364 F. Supp. 316
(D.N.J. 1973). In a later ruling, the court, sitting in equity, ordered Brunswick to divest
itself of the illegally acquired centers. Treadway Cos. v. Brunswick Corp., 389 F. Supp. 996
(D.N.J. 1974).
15The court of appeals reversed on the ground that the charge to the jury on the liability issue was "virtually a directed verdict," because it emphasized market shares to the exclusion of the specific capability of Brunswick to monopolize the affected markets. NBO
Indus. Treadway Cos. v. Brunswick Corp., 523 F.2d 262, 274 (3d Cir. 1976). It refused to
order a directed verdict for Brunswick, since, it said, there was evidence sufficient to go to
the jury that Brunswick's "deep pocket" preserved centers that would otherwise have failed,
and gave Brunswick the power to finance anticompetitive practices. Id. at 273. It also reversed the divestiture order, saying that "less drastic relief will provide sufficient redress."
Id. at 279.
16 Id. at 273.
17 Brunswick

Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 490-91 (1977). The decision on injunctive relief was not disturbed because Brunswick had not petitioned for certiorari on the issue.
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tablishes only that injury may result."1 8 Justice Marshall then rejected the ruling by the court of appeals that all injury caused by a
violation is compensable; he noted that such a ruling "divorces antitrust recovery from the purposes of the antitrust laws.""" Congress did not prohibit mergers because they cause economic readjustments, but because they may reduce competition.
Justice Marshall reasoned that since liability was based on
Brunswick's capacity to finance predatory practices out of its
"deep pocket," any recoverable damages must be traceable to
predatory conduct. But since the measure of damages that the
court of appeals adopted was based solely on the profits lost by the
plaintiffs after Brunswick began operating the defaulting centers-profits lost, in other words, because of continued competition-it was inconsistent with the basis of substantive liability.
More importantly, that measure of damages was also inconsistent
with the fundamental purpose of the antitrust laws: "The damages
respondents obtained are designed to provide them with the profits
they would have realized had competition been reduced." 20 To permit such a damage award would be to confuse injury to competitors with injury to competition. The Court therefore held that
for plaintiffs to recover treble damages on account of § 7 violations, they must prove more than injury causally linked to
an illegal presence in the market. Plaintiffs must prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type the antitrust
laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which
makes defendants' acts unlawful. The injury should reflect the
anticompetitive effect either of the violation or of anticompetitive acts made possible by the violation. It should, in short,
be "the type of loss that the claimed violation ... would be
'
likely to cause. 21
Since Brunswick was decided, the defense bar has seized upon
the notion of "antitrust injury" as a weapon of commercial warfare, raising it routinely as a defense in treble-damage litigation.
The antitrust-injury concept has become one of profound practical
and theoretical importance, although the courts have not been uniId. at 486.
Id. at 486-87.
20 Id. at 488.
18
'

" Id. at 489 (emphasis in original) (quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research,
Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 125 (1969)).
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formly receptive to it.2 2 But the decisions indicate that the courts

and litigants lack any firm conceptual basis for identifying antitrust injury.
Such a basis is provided, however, by the recognition that antitrust policy should be directed toward promoting efficiency, or ''as
24
some prefer to call it, consumer welfare.23 The "rule of reason
narrows the class of illegal restraints from all those that limit any
individual's commercial freedom to those that limit the efficient
operation of markets generally. In parallel fashion, antitrust injury
can consistently be seen as narrowing the standard for recoverable
damages from all those suffered by the plaintiff as a result of an
antitrust violation to those that actually flow from the aspect of
the violation that causes market inefficiency. As the Supreme
Court has said, the Sherman Act was
enacted to prevent not the mere injury to an individual which
would arise from the doing of the prohibited acts, but the
harm to the general public which would be occasioned by
the evils which it was contemplated would be prevented, and
hence not only the prohibitions of the statute but the remedies which it provided were coextensive with such conceptions.2 5
Many courts have refused to extend the concept of antitrust injury as a limitation on
damages. See, e.g., Lee-Moore Oil Co. v. Union Oil Co., 599 F.2d 1299, 1302-03 (4th Cir.
1979); Purex Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 596 F.2d 881, 888 (9th Cir. 1979); Ohio-Sealy
Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 585 F.2d 821, 832-33 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
930 (1979); Heatransfer Corp. v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 553 F.2d 964, 984-85 (5th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1087 (1978); Fuchs Sugars & Syrups, Inc. v. Amstar Corp., 447 F.
Supp. 867, 878 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Laughlin v. Wells, 446 F. Supp. 48, 52 (C.D. Cal. 1978); L &
H Investments, Ltd. v. Belvey Corp., 444 F. Supp. 1321, 1323-25 (W.D.N.C. 1978); Admiral
Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co., 437 F. Supp. 1268, 1295-96 (D. Neb. 1977), afl'd, 585
F.2d 877 (1978). Defendants have had some success under the new doctrine, however. See,
e.g., Lupia v. Stella D'Oro Biscuit Co., 586 F.2d 1163, 1168-69 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 982 (1979); John Lenore & Co. v. Olympia Brewing Co., 550 F.2d 495, 498-500 (9th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 990 (1979); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F. Supp.
384, 401-03 (D. Del. 1978); Uniroyal, Inc. v. Jetco Auto Serv., Inc., 461 F. Supp. 350, 359
(S.D.N.Y. 1978); Murphy Tugboat Co. v. Crowley, 454 F. Supp. 847, 852-57 (N.D. Cal. 1978);
Juneau Square Corp. v. First Wis. Nat'l Bank, 445 F. Supp. 965, 973-76 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
23 See R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 50-133 (1978); W. BOWMAN, PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAw 1-14 (1973); R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 18-22
(1976) [hereinafter cited as ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE]; Dam, supra note 4, at 28-31, 39-40;
Director & Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 Nw. U.L. REv. 281 (1956);
Schwartz, Book Review, 43 U. CH. L. REV.858 (1976). But see L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 2-13 (1977).
'" See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60, 63-68 (1911).
15 D.R. Wilder Mfg. Co. v. Corn Prods. Ref. Co., 236 U.S. 165, 174 (1915) (emphasis
added).
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The interpretation of the language of both the substantive and the
remedial provisions of the antitrust laws must therefore be guided
by the overall statutory purpose of promoting competition. And
just as economic analysis of the effects of various practices on efficiency should guide the development of the rule of reason in the
formulation of substantive rules, so the same tools should give content to the concept of antitrust injury.
II. THE DETERRENT FUNCTION OF TREBLE DAMAGES
If treble-damage actions are to promote economic efficiency,
the size of the award should approximate the social cost or inefficiency caused by the violation, discounted by the likelihood that
the conduct will be discovered and penalized.2 6 Firms will not engage in a practice if their expected gain in doing so is less than
their expected (private) cost, including any penalties incurred for
violating the antitrust laws. If this expected cost exceeds the social
cost, firms will be deterred from pursuing activities that promise
greater value than any inefficiency resulting from those activities.
This danger is particularly great where the activity enables the
firm to achieve economies by the integration of productive or distributive processes, yet causes no immediate reductions in output.
But even if the activity has no such redeeming qualities, an excessive penalty may deter similar, efficient activities that firms only
perceive as violations .because the law is unclear. In either case,
deterrence of the conduct by penalties unrelated to the social cost
would itself be inefficient.
The bulk of this article will consider the difficulties inherent
in using private damage awards as a deterrent to anticompetitive
conduct. Any analysis along the lines I am suggesting necessarily
assumes that the primary function of the treble-damage action is
deterrence of such conduct rather than compensation of victims,
subsidization of small businesses, or similar goals directed to the
private rather than the social cost of violations. This assumption is
justified, however, on the basis of both statutory interpretation
26 See ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE, supra note 23, at 221-24; Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 176-79, 180-85, 191-93 (1968).
27 See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978); R. BORK, supra

note 23, at 78 ("Just as protected speech lies next to that which may be outlawed, so does
vigorous price competition adjoin that which goes too far and is predatory. It is not socially
desirable that conduct in either of the two adjacent areas be deterred."); R. PosNER, EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 20.4 (2d ed. 1977).
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and sound policy considerations.
The legislative history of the Sherman Act is notoriously malleable, assuming virtually any shape the advocate desires. Nonetheless, there is evidence in the early congressional debates to support the primacy of the deterrent function. The present section 4
of the Clayton Act follows the language of the original section 7 of
the Sherman Act,28 which Thorelli concludes, in his authoritative
study29 of the debates, was intended to make the antitrust law selfenforcing, in keeping with the vision of an efficiently operating economic system. By creating incentives for those injured by monopolistic practices to seek redress in the courts, section 7 was designed
to encourage individuals to enforce the Sherman Act for the benefit of society.3 0 At the same time, the framers of the section seem
to have had no illusions about its suitability as a vehicle for compensating those injured by monopolistic practices. The number of
individuals injured would normally be so large that the courts
would be incapable of providing full and fair compensation. The
framers explicitly rejected, for example, an amendment that would
have permitted joinder as plaintiffs of all those injured by a violation." One can conclude that they expected the statute to deter
anticompetitive conduct rather than systematically to make whole
those who had been injured by past inefficiency. A similar purpose
32
may be gleaned from the legislative history of the Clayton Act.
The Supreme Court's interpretation of section 4 of the Clayton Act has generally reinforced the provision's role as a deterrent."3 The Hanover Shoe3 4 and Illinois Brick 5 decisions, for example, held that direct purchasers are, as a matter of law, the
persons injured by illegal overcharges, even if part of the cost increase was passed on to others. Recognizing the complexity of the

"RSherman Act, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (superseded by Clayton Act, § 4, 15
U.S.C. § 15 (1976)).
=' H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY (1955).
30 Id.
at 225, 229, 588.
" 21 CONG. REC. 3147-48, 3150-51 (1890). See also 21 CONG. REC. 1767-68 (1890) (remarks of Sen. George).
"2See 51 CONG. REc. 16274-75 (1914) (remarks of Rep. Webb) (treble damages "will
have a more deterrent effect on the men who practice those things than a mere criminal
penalty").
33 See, e.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 315 (1978); Nashville
Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373, 387 (1958) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Bruce's Juices,
Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 751-52 (1947).
34 Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 487-94 (1968).
11 Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
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evidentiary issues that would have to be resolved if the theory of
passing on were permitted for either plaintiffs or defendants, the
Court found that
the legislative purpose in creating a group of "'private attorneys general'" to enforce the antitrust laws under § 4

. .

. is

better served by holding direct purchasers to be injured to the
full extent of the overcharge paid by them than by attempting
to apportion the overcharge among all that may have absorbed a part of it.36
The Court recognized that it is more important that the penalty be
imposed than that the damages be divided fairly. On the other
hand, in Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.,3 7 the Court found that ultimate
consumers should be permitted to recover if they are direct purchasers, since to deny them standing would allow the price fixing
to go unchallenged altogether.
Brunswick, however, contains a passage that, at first sight, is
troubling:
[T]reble damages also play an important role in penalizing
wrongdoers and deterring wrongdoing, as we also have frequently observed. .

.

. It nevertheless is true that the treble-

damages provision, which makes awards available only to injured parties, and measures the awards by a multiple of the
injury actually proved, is designed primarily as a remedy. 8
Although easily misunderstood, this passage is fully consistent
with the deterrence rationale if read in context. By characterizing
the purpose of section 4 as remedial, the Court emphasized that
damages must be for actual injury; it did not suggest that damages
should compensate all those injured by antitrust violations. The
remainder of the opinion makes clear that implicit in the Court's
understanding of the remedial function is the requirement that
any damage recovery be related to the inefficiency-causing effects
of the conduct in question.3 9
The Court's reasoning and the legislative history giving priority to the deterrent function are consistent with an economic interpretation of the function of antitrust damages. Although damages
Id. at 746 (quoting Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972)).
3 442 U.S. 330 (1979).
429 U.S. at 485-86 (citations and footnote omitted).
Id. at 486-89.
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certainly serve to compensate as well as to deter,4 0 the principal
function of compensation from an economic point of view should
be to spur private parties to bring suit; to the extent the deterrent
function is served, compensation will become unnecessary, because
the amount of competitive harm will be reduced.4 1 Since litigation
is costly, deterring future violations would waste fewer real resources than would be wasted by simply providing compensation
whenever violations occur. Furthermore, antitrust actions are unlikely to accomplish compensation in any equitable way. As Professor Posner has noted,
Everybody's economic welfare is bound up with everybody
else's. Why stop with the ultimate consumer? If he is forced
to pay a higher price for a product, his demand for other
products will fall and this may hurt the suppliers of those
products, and the suppliers' suppliers, and so on ad
infinitum.' 2
As the antitrust-standing cases recognize,' 3 it is impossible for the
damage provison to restore all the individual members of society to
4
the position they would have held but for the violation.
Even theoretically, compensation cannot be separated from
deterrence as an objective of antitrust remedies. Treble-damage
awards will deter the conduct penalized regardless of the rationale
for imposing the award. If the size of the penalty is unrelated to
the anticompetitive effects of the conduct involved, the damage
award will either leave incentives to engage in anticompetitive conduct or create deterrents to efficient conduct. The central insight
of Brunswick was that there are inefficient levels of deterrence. 5
1o See, e.g., Areeda, supra note 9.
41 See Landes & Posner, Should Indirect PurchasersHave Standing to Sue Under the
Antitrust Laws? An Economic Analysis of the Rule of Illinois Brick, 46 U. Cm. L. REv. 602,
605 (1979).
42 R. POSNER, ANTITRusT: CASES, ECONOMic NOTES, & OTHER MATERIALS 149 (1974).
4' See text and notes at notes 116-136 infra.
" "The lower courts have been virtually unanimous in concluding that Congress did
not intend the antitrust laws to provide a remedy in damages for all injuries that might
conceivably be traced to an antitrust violation." Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251,
262 n.14 (1972).
'5The Court has recognized the danger of overdeterrence in other contexts. See, e.g.,
id. at 262-64 (state denied right to sue for damages to its "general economy" because a
recovery would duplicate damages of other potential plaintiffs); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,
431 U.S. 730, 730-31 (1977) (permitting indirect purchasers to sue, while presuming that the
direct purchaser has not passed on the illegal overcharge, "substantially increases the possibility of inconsistent adjudications-and therefore of unwarranted multiple liability for the
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Since the antitrust laws "were enacted for 'the protection of competition, not competitors,' "46 to allow recovery for the efficiency
gains associated with a nominal violation would contradict the un"derlying purpose of the law.
III.

TOWARD A DEFINITION OF ANTITRUST INJURY

As noted earlier, in order to deter anticompetitive activity, the
amount of damages awarded should equal the efficiency loss to society attributable to the defendant's conduct, discounted by the
likelihood of the violation being discovered. But private treble
damages only roughly approximate this standard. The trebling of
damages, for example, was never intended to be a discounting factor,47 and scarcely serves that function. It seems to overstate the
likelihood of apprehension for concealable offenses such as price
fixing, 48 and to understate it for other easily detectable offenses,
such as tying arrangements. Furthermore, a number of practical
limitations prevent the final damage award from ever truly reflecting the actual injury to either the plaintiff or society. The available
accounting data, for example, may be insufficient to justify any
award, and when an award is made, its relationship to the actual
injury may be tenuous at best.49 Other factors, such as the tax
treatment of damage awards and the statute of limitations, may
limit the deterrent force of a damage award. 0 But all of these constraints are common to any system of liability, and do not represent conclusive grounds for doubting the suitability of the statutory scheme for its purpose.
There is, however, a more serious potential flaw in a statutory
scheme that relies on the private damage action to achieve the economically appropriate level of deterrence: the efficiency loss to society that should determine the level of deterrence does not coincide with the losses that individual economic actors suffer from
defendant"). See also Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516 (1959).
4' Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (quoting Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)).
47 The trebling provision was imported from the original Statute of Monopolies, 21 Jac.
1, c. 3 (1624).
48 Criminal penalties for these offenses partly compensate for the inadequacy of the
discounting factor. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976).
49 See Note, Private Treble Damage Antitrust Suits: Measure of Damages for Destruction of All or Part of a Business, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1566, 1572-74 (1967).
50 See, e.g., Parker, Treble Damage Action-A FinancialDeterrent to Antitrust Violations?, 16 ANTITRUST BULL. 483 (1971); Wheeler, Antitrust Treble-Damage Actions: Do
They Work?, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1319 (1973).
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antitrust violations. In Brunswick, for example, the unlawful acquisitions caused no inefficiency, but had a substantial impact on
the profitability of the competing bowling centers. This disjunction
between the private and social cost of antitrust violations is not
unique to the facts of Brunswick.51 Many violations are forms of
aggressive competition that have crossed the indistinct line into
the region the law deems predatory. Analogously, other violations
involve integrations of productive or distributive processes that result in real economies. Although there may be no social cost-or
harm to consumers-from these nominal violations, the harm to
competitors or distributors may be quite concrete. This flaw is
more serious than the use of an incorrect multiple to discount for
the probability of apprehension, because individual injury may
bear no relation at all to the social cost of the violation.
The concept of antitrust injury goes a long way toward correcting this imbalance. The Brunswick Court defined antitrust injury as "injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes the defendants' acts
unlawful. ' 52 In economic -terms, this is the injury to economic actors that is traceable to those aspects of the violation that cause
economic inefficiencies. Approaching the efficient level of deterrence requires an analysis of the competitive effects of violations
and the kinds of individual injury associated with them. Although
the individual's injury, even under this approach, is not identical
to the total inefficiency associated with the violation, it is nonetheless related to it, and the relationship keeps the potential damage
award connected with its deterrent purpose.
In this section I will try to show, using a discussion of the efficiency effects of various practices as a paradigm, that the concept
of antitrust injury is implicit in some principal rules of antitrust
damages. A description of the economics of antitrust injury as the
courts have viewed it in cartel cases and in certain cases involving
exclusionary practices will provide a framework for testing the implications of the concept in other settings.

"

The language of the Clayton Act requires only that the effect on competition be in-

cipient in order to establish a violation. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976). In such cases, no direct effect
on market price need be shown. But the idea of incipiency is not confined to this statute:
the Sherman Act also has consistently been read in this way. See Klor's, Inc. v. BroadwayHale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1959). See also Chrysler Credit Corp. v. J. Truett
Payne, Inc., 607 F.2d 1133, 1136-37 (5th Cir. 1979) (Robinson-Patman Act).
52 429 U.S. at 489 (1977).
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Cartels

Cartels and horizontal mergers reduce allocative efficiencyreallocating resources in a way that reduces the value of society's
output to consumers-if they provide the participants with the
power to raise the market price above the competitive level.53 At
the higher price, the industry's output is necessarily lower, resulting in an inefficient use of resources; the output that consumers
would value above the cost of production is lost. This reduction in
value is what economists call the deadweight or "triangle" loss in
welfare attributable to monopoly. The higher price also provides
the sellers with monopoly profits, but this effect has not traditionally been viewed as either efficient or inefficient in itself. The mo-

53

The relative efficiency of competitive and cartelized markets can be illustrated

diagrammatically. See ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE, supra note 23, at 10. See also C. K. RowLEY,
ANTITRUST AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 18-19 (1973); Harberger, Monopoly and Resource Allocation, 44 AM. ECON. REv. PAPERS & PROC. 77 (1954).

PM

MP
PMC

X
\MR

QMn

D_

Qc

Quantity

The industry demand curve D represents the amount of the product consumers are willing
to buy at each price. At the competitive output (Qc), the price (Pc) is equal to the cost (MC)
of producing the last unit of output. The area under the demand curve but above MC represents the surplus value to consumers of the product at Pc, who would have purchased the
product at higher prices. By collusively restricting output to Qm, where marginal revenue
(MR) is set equal to MC, the producers obtain the monopoly profit represented by the area
MP by capturing part of the consumers' surplus that existed under competition. The triangular area X represents the so-called deadweight welfare loss created by the restriction of
output: it is value lost to consumers (who are forced to seek out more costly substitutes) and
not recaptured by the producers.
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nopoly profits represent only a transfer of income from one group,
the purchasers of the monopolized product, to another, the owners
of the firm selling the product.5
Thus, the usual economic objection to price fixing is not that
it redistributes income by generating monopoly profits, but that it
creates a deadweight welfare loss to society by restricting output.
Yet the courts have uniformly held that the proper measure of
damages in price-fixing cases is the overcharge, the difference between cartel price and the competitive price, variously defined.55
The private injury-which would in the limit equal the monopoly
profits-is distinct from the social cost.5 6
It is nonetheless clear that the traditional measure of damages
is economically sound. Although the monopoly profits are a transfer payment, they flow from the aspect of the conduct that causes
inefficiency, since they are created by the same output restriction
that creates the deadweight loss. We need not accept the hypothesis that these profits also approximate a social cost of the cartel to
see that they are properly regarded as illicit.57 They are caused by
the output restriction-a market inefficiency-and represent an inducement to create it,55 without increasing social wealth.
The full overcharge is a proper measure of damages even if
part of it is paid to the defendant's nonconspiring competitors who
sell at the cartel price.5 9 A collusive price increase may call forth
greater output from less efficient but competitive firms that take

54 Professor Posner has argued that the area MP, in the diagram in note 53 supra,
should also be viewed as a welfare loss since it approximates the amount of real resources
wasted in seeking and maintaining a monopoly position. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. EcoN. 807 (1975).
15 E.g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 n.14 (1972); Chattanooga Foundry
& Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906).
51 See Breit, Efficiency and Equity Considerations,8 Sw. U.L. Rav. 539, 542-43 (1976).
57 By the same theory, illegal wealth-maximizing conduct by a monopolist may result in
compensable transfer payments even if the conduct does not in itself cause an output restriction. Hanover Shoe Co. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968). But see SCM
Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 463 F. Supp. 983 (D. Conn. 1978) (damages to potential competitors
caused by defendant's refusal to license patents not recoverable).
8 There are social benefits if monopoly profits are reinvested in product improvement,
cost-reduction programs, and innovation. But such a defense should be inadmissible since it
is equally likely that the cost reductions and innovation would have occurred under competition. C. BANE, THE ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT CONSPIRACIES: THE TREBLE DAMAGEs ACTIONS
67 (1973). See also Ohio Valley Elec. Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 244 F. Supp. 914, 941-42
(S.D.N.Y. 1965).
59 Wall Prods. Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 357 F. Supp. 832, 840-42 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
But see Mid-West Paper Prods. Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 578, 586 (3d Cir.
1979).
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the cartel price as given.60 These firms have no incentive to set a
lower price, since they can sell all they produce at the cartel price.
Although their output reduces the cartelists' power to increase the
price above the competitive level, whatever collusive price increase
that does occur must flow directly from the cartelists' restriction of
output. It is true that in these circumstances the price increase
does not result in a simple wealth transfer to the cartel; part of the
overcharge will go to the nonconspiring firms. Nonetheless, the
inefficiency-both from the cartelists' own output restriction and
from the increased output of less efficient firms-is directly attributable to the cartel."

MCMC
MRc

Qf

Q, Qm

Qc

Quantity

At the competitive price Pc, the market supply curve MCc intersects the market demand
curve Dm at output Qc. If firms agree to restrict output, they must take account of the
output of nonconspiring firms (whose supply curve is given by MCf) that will enter the
market at the higher prices. By subtracting these firms' output from the market demand at
any given price, the cartel can constrtict the demand curve that it faces (AB) and the marginal revenue curve (MRc) drawn to AB. It may then set its profit-maximizing output where
MCc intersects MRc, yielding a price of P,.At that price, the nonconspirators will expand
output to Qf, where MCf equals P1 . The total market output then is Qf + Q, or Qm. The
area X1 represents the cost increase from the increased production of the less efficient nonconspirators; the area X2 represents the welfare loss from the restriction of market output

from Qc to Qm.
61 The larger deterrent penalty is justified here since much of the overcharge paid to
the nonconspiring firms reflects increased production costs (the area X, in the diagram in
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Those who pay illegal overcharges are not the only ones who
suffer antitrust injury as a result of a cartel: the restriction of production may cut off entirely some who would have purchased the
affected goods at the competitive price. The cartel members may,
for example, refuse to deal at all with a distributor, or may raise
their price beyond the distributor's ability to pay.6 2 Under such
circumstances the distributor would be forced to seek out alternative but less preferable sources of supplies, suffering antitrust injury in the form of increased transaction costs and higher prices.
These increased costs, even more than the overcharge itself, flow
from the inefficiency-causing aspect of the cartel because the distributor has been forced to purchase more costly substitutes for
the affected product.
Damages based upon this theory, of course, will often be too
speculative to support recovery. 3 Since anyone can assert that he

note 60 supra).
62 On refusal to deal, see, for example, Engine Specialities, Inc. v. Bombardier Ltd., 605
F.2d 1, 12-15 (1st Cir. 1979); Lee-Moore Oil Co. v. Union Oil Co., 599 F.2d 1299 (4th Cir.
1979).
On raising price, see, for example, the early case of Gibbs v. McNeeley, 102 F. 594 (D.
Wash. 1900), rev'd, 118 F. 120 (9th Cir. 1902), where suppliers of cedar shingles had formed
"an unincorporated association having for its purpose the prevention of injurious competition," id. at 595, an object that they accomplished by a restriction of production that included a 60-day closing of the members' mills. The plaintiff, a distributor of cedar shingles,
alleged that the price increase that accompanied the output restriction had caused his customers to refuse to purchase from him and that the closing of the mills had caused him to
lose sales he would otherwise have made. The trial court's dismissal of the claims on the
grounds that the suppliers' association did not affect interstate commerce was later reversed, but no decision on the merits was ever reported. There would seem to be no theoretical reason why these damages should not be compensable. The defendants' conduct is, in
effect, a refusal to deal except upon an unlawful condition, the payment of the cartel price.
See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 376-78 (1927); R.
POSNER, supra note 42, at 539. The plaintiff's damages flow from the collusive price increase: if the price increase raised the plaintiff's cost and hence his prices, to the extent that
his purchasers substituted toward more costly roofing materials, and if it could be shown
that the plaintiff would have purchased and resold the shingles at the competitive price,
then the plaintiff should recover his damages. Because of the rule requiring mitigation of
damages, see text and notes at notes 77-82 infra, recovery would be limited by the difference between the collusive price and the cost of substitutes.
Identical reasoning would apply to the mill closings; the inability of the plaintiff to
obtain the product because of the closings is indistinguishable from his being charged a
collusive price that exceeds what his purchasers are willing to pay. An appropriate measure
of damages under such circumstances would be the plaintiff's fixed costs and his anticipated
accounting profit. This measure would reimburse him in an amount approximating his cost
of being in the business of reselling the cartelists' product.
'3 See generally Wolfe v. National Lead Co., 225 F.2d 427, 432 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 915 (1955); American Sea Green Slate Co. v. O'Halloran, 229 F. 77, 80-81 (2d Cir.
1915).
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would have purchased the product at the competitive price, the
plaintiff must prove by a prior course of dealings or by actual offers to purchase during the conspiracy period that he would have
done so. These conditions will be satisfied in some circumstances.
Consider, for example, a middleman who contracted to supply uranium for a period of years at a certain price. If he is forced to
break the contract because his own suppliers collusively raise the
price, he should recover from his suppliers whatever damages he
must pay for breach of contract.
The foregoing measures of damages do not deter any gains in
productive efficiency 64-that is, reductions in the average cost of
production-that a horizontal agreement makes possible. Such arrangements, particularly mergers, may increase efficiency in production if they reduce the firm's unit costs by an integration of
productive, managerial, or financial facilities. 5 Although these
Productive efficiency consists of minimizing the costs of the individual firm for any
given level of output. See generally E. ROBINSON, THE STRUCTURE OF COMPETITIVE INDUSTRY
(4th ed. 1958). Cartels do not necessarily reduce the average costs of production; participation in a cartel may raise the firm's costs by requiring expenditures for policing or various
forms of nonprice competition. Posner, supra note 54. Further, some have argued that reduction in competition because of participation in a cartel may reduce the firm's incentive
to minimize costs, resulting in "X-inefficiency." See, e.g., C.K. ROWLEY, supra note 53, at 53;
Leibenstein, Allocative Efficiency vs. "X-Efficiency," 56 AM. ECON. REV. 392 (1966). But see
Stigler, The Xistence of X-Efficiency, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 213 (1976).
5 Professor Williamson illustrates this development with the following "naive tradeoff
model":

A
P [ MP

Q.

Q.

Quantity

The welfare loss (X) from the restriction of output is still present, but it is compensated by
an increase in efficiency (CS) represented by a reduction in cost from AC1 to AC. The cost
savings result in higher economic profit for the producer, but release real resources for other
productive uses. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Trade-Offs,
58 AM. ECON. REV. 18, 21 (1968). See also R. BORK, supra note 23, at 107.
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kinds of economies do not justify a cartel 6e or a merger that
reduces output,67 they should not be actively deterred by the damage remedy since they represent a social benefit that may partially
offset any allocative inefficiency. These cost savings represent part
of the profit generated by the cartel, and are in that respect an
inducement to engage in the cartel activity. But to set damages
equal to the cost savings would represent overdeterrence.
Of course, a purchaser who paid an overcharge would not recover the savings in any case, since the portion of the price attributable to the cost savings would have been paid in the absence of
the cartel. Individuals directly injured by the cost savings also are
not entitled to recover any damages. For example, employees dismissed as a result of more efficient management or production
techniques are harmed by the formation of the cartel, but should
not be viewed as suffering antitrust injury. To permit them to recover damages would deter the creation of productive efficiency
and thus increase any welfare loss from the arrangement.
We see, then, that the traditional definition of damages for
cartel practices is consistent with the idea of antitrust injury. It
permits recovery for wealth transfers caused by the collusive restriction of output, but not for new wealth created by those aspects
of the restraint that are efficient. As a logical extension, it should
permit recovery for losses to purchasers who are unwilling or unable to meet the collusive price.
B.

Exclusionary Practices
Allocative efficiency may also be impaired by predation. 8 If,

66 Price fixing is, at any rate, a per se offense, one of those "practices which because of
their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively
presumed to be unreasonable and, therefore, illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use." Northern Pac. Ry. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (emphasis added). Price fixing is therefore illegal even if
it increases efficiency by protecting investment in promotional activities, United States v.
Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967), or by making useful cost and production information available to producers. American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 337 (1921).

The substantive law makes no exceptions, because economic techniques are viewed as inadequate to measure the welfare gains and losses from particular practices. See R. BORK, supra
note 23, at 123. See also United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609-11 (1972).
'7

See, e.g., FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); United States v. Phila-

delphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294
(1962). But see Williamson, supra note 65.

" The efficiency effects of predation are illustrated in the following diagram:
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for example, a would-be monopolist sets his price below cost (properly defined), customers may substitute away from less costly but
competitively priced products of other firms. In addition, output at
the lower price will expand to inefficient levels, because the cost of
production exceeds the value consumers place on the product. The
lower prices result in a wealth transfer (again, in itself neither efficient nor inefficient), this time from the producers to their customers. Furthermore, if successful, their predation will give the
predator a greater market share, and, therefore, greater power to
increase the price above cost, causing the additional welfare losses
associated with monopoly.
It is important to recognize, however, that firms may engage in
activities that necessarily involve exclusion of competitors but that
are intended to increase productive efficiency. Thus, the mere fact
that a firm has been excluded or foreclosed from selling does not
necessarily mean that it has suffered antitrust injury. Similarly, by
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The object of the predator is to drive out of the market a competitor with output q, thereby
permitting the predator to raise its price above marginal cost by setting Pm at Qm. To do
this, it must increase industry output to drive the market price below cost. 'This results in
inefficiently high output Qp, ince the cost of the marginal units of production exceeds the
value given them by consumers. See Areeda & Turner, PredatoryPricingand Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARv. L. REv. 697, 712-13 (1975). The welfare
loss during the period of predation is represented by the triangle X.. If the predator is
successful and is later able to restrict output to Qm, there is an additional welfare loss X2 .
See Janich Bros., Inc. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848, 857-58 (9th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978).
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the very act of competing by reducing prices or improving quality,
firms deny each other some part of the market, thus reducing each
others' profitability. Indeed, the more efficient a firm becomes in
its production, the greater the "injury" it imposes on its competitors. 9 It is, therefore, important to distinguish legitimate competitive conduct from predation in defining antitrust injury, as the
Court did in Brunswick.7" The principle we draw from Brunswick
is that reductions in profit attributable to conduct by the defendant that preserves allocative efficiency or that increases its productive efficiency cannot be recovered as damages.7 1 A competitor
should be compensated only to the extent he was harmed by the
72
defendant's below-cost pricing.
The traditional measures of damages for the total exclusion of
a competitor from the market accurately reflect antitrust injury.
Exclusionary practices usually fall into one of two patterns. In the
first, a potential competitor is denied entry to a market because of
the existing competitors' control of a necessary facility or resource.
The inefficiency produced by such exclusion is clear; the expansion

4, See Janich Bros., Inc. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848, 855 (9th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978).
70 By the same reasoning, a purchaser from a predator should recover only the increment in price attributable to the unlawful conduct, not the entire difference between the
predator's price and a competitive price. See Berkey Photo, Inc., v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603
F.2d 263, 297-98 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1061 (1980); 3 P. AREEDA & D.
TURNER,

supra note 3, at 73.

The Court found that a judgment notwithstanding the verdict should have been entered for Brunswick, despite evidence assembled by the plaintiff that Brunswick had used
its "deep pocket" to finance inefficient practices aimed at weakening independent bowling
centers in the relevant markets. 429 U.S. at 489-90. The plaintiff's evidence of predation
was, in the Court's view, unpersuasive. Id. at 490 n.15. By necessary implication, the Court's
refusal to permit a retrial on the damage claim indicates that the Court viewed Brunswick's
conduct as legitimately competitive.
The plaintiff's charges of deep-pocket predatory activity, both as to price-cutting and
excessive promotional and capital expenditures, were part of a general contention that
Brunswick operated its centers at a loss. Although the Court explicitly rejected the evidence
of price cutting, it responded to the charge of below-cost operation by referring to the cash
flow of Brunswick's centers in each market. By approving the continued operation of the
centers with a positive cash flow, but an accounting loss, the Court accepted Brunswick's
contention that "[t]he crucial concern when one focuses on 'deep pocket' considerations
should not be with paper 'profits' or 'losses,' but rather with whether cash flowed from petitioner to a boy/ling center or the other way." Brief for Petitioner at 10a-11a. In other words,
the issue is whether the acquiring company is financing inefficient operation of the acquired
company. If revenues exceed all economic costs, there can be no inefficiency.
7" See text at notes 98-105 infra. But see Purex Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 596
F.2d 881 (9th Cir. 1979). Purex stands Brunswick on its head by invoking it to permit damages in a merger case for lost profits flowing from increased competition made possible by an
unlawful merger.
71
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of industry output is impeded without any compensating gains in
productive efficiency. To a degree, the injury to potential entrants
mirrors the harm to consumers who do not purchase from cartelists at the cartel price: both are damaged by the allocative inefficiency created by the restricted supply. The courts have held that
the excluded seller's damages should be based on the sales he
would have made but for the boycott. Thus, in Zenith Radio Corp.
v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,7 3 Zenith introduced evidence that it
had been excluded from the Canadian market because of a Canadian patent pool's denial of the necessary licenses. Zenith's damages were determined by reference to its share in the United States
market, which, the Court reasoned, Zenith could have duplicated
in Canada but for the patent pool. The pool prevented Zenith from
"securing a share of the market. . . which its business proficiency,
demonstrated in the United States, dictated it should have obtained in Canada. '7 4 Such damages flowed from that aspect of the
violation that caused inefficiency, since the damages reflected returns on output that the market would have supported but for the
75
collusive impediment to new entry.
In the second pattern of exclusionary practices, a group of
firms exclude an actual competitor by some form of predatory conduct. The usual measure of antitrust damages for destruction of an
existing business is its "going concern" value, which is the present
value of the business's expected profits in the market over and
above the ordinary rate of return on the firm's assets.7 8 Even after
the exclusionary practice the firm still has its original assets, so the
antitrust damages equal the loss of the special profit-making potential that those assets would have provided as part of a going
concern. These damages are an appropriate measure of antitrust
injury in the case of predation by competitors. They represent, in
essence, the excluded firm's opportunity cost, which depends in
part upon the price level in the market. Thus, the quantum of
395 U.S. 100 (1969).
Id. at 124-25.
71 This measure would not be appropriate where the method of exclusion is a unilateral
refusal to license patents, since exclusion is inherent in the grant of a patent monopoly. See
SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 463 F. Supp. 983, 1003-04 (D. Conn. 1978).
71 See Standard Oil Co. v. Moore, 251 F.2d 188, 219-20 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356
U.S. 975 (1958). See also Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 411 F.2d 897, 909-10 (9th Cir.), rev'd on
other grounds, 396 U.S. 13 (1969) (per curiam); Vandervelde v. Put & Call Brokers & Dealers Ass'n, 344 F. Supp. 118 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). See generally Greenwald, Capitalized Pricing
of Injury to Capital in Treble Damage Suits, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 84 (1959).
7

74
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damages is related to the size of the monopoly profits that the
would-be predator expects to gain. Stated another way, the larger
the output restriction by the successful predators, the greater the
expected profits of the excluded firm had it remained in the market. Although these profits exceed an average rate of return, their
loss is nonetheless antitrust injury, since they represent the potential return on output of a competitor excluded by the predators
from the market.
C.

Mitigation of Damages

The familiar principle that a plaintiff must mitigate his damages is inherent in the idea of antitrust injury. The inefficiency
created by a violation is the increase in cost that it causes. If the
plaintiff does not follow the least costly alternative open to him,
the added cost is attributable to the plaintiff's own actions, not to
the violation.7 8 Thus, in Sun Cosmetic Shoppe, Inc. v. Elizabeth
Arden Sales Corp., 9 the court found that a retail cosmetic store
that was discriminatorily denied "demonstrators" by its supplier
could not recover consequential damages for any diversion of sales,
since the plaintiff could have employed its own demonstrators.
Damages were limited to the cost of finding and hiring the demonstrators.8 0 And more recently, in Golf City, Inc. v. Wilson Sporting
Goods Co.,"' a sporting goods retailer who was denied pro-line golf
equipment was required to seek out substitutes and alternative
sources of supply. In both cases, the courts recognized that to permit a plaintiff voluntarily to increase the costs associated with a
violation and then to recover that amount as damages would be
77

77 See Golf City, Inc. v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 555 F.2d 426, 436 (5th Cir. 1977);
Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 464 F.2d 26, 46-47 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1077 (1972);
Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459, 478 (9th Cir.) (Madden, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964); Sun Cosmetic Shoppe, Inc. v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 178
F.2d 150, 153 (2d Cir. 1949); William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 69 F. Supp.
103, 104-05 (E.D. Pa. 1946), aff'd per curiam, 164 F.2d 1021 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S.
811 (1948); Lowry v. Tile, Mantel & Grate Ass'n, 106 F. 38, 47 (N.D. Cal. 1900), aff'd sub
nom. Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U.S. 38 (1904).
" This distinction is inherent in the notion of economic or "opportunity" costs. See
generally Coase, The Nature of Costs, in STUDIES IN COST ANALYSIS 118 (2d ed. D. Solomons
1968).
79 178 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1949) (L. Hand, C.J.).
8o Id. at 153. For a criticism of Sun Cosmetic, see State Wholesale Grocers v. Great Atl.
& Pac. Tea Co., 202 F.Supp. 768, 776-77 (N.D. 111. 1961). See also K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT,
THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES: A STUDY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 84-86 (1976).
81 555 F.2d 426, 436 (5th Cir. 1977).
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anticompetitive. Damages are thus limited to the difference in
value between the product or service that the injured plaintiff was
denied and the closest available substitute. As Sun Cosmetic
makes clear, however, if a violation causes the plaintiff to make
such a substitution, the plaintiff should recover as damages
whatever transaction costs he incurs, since these costs also represent resources wasted as a result of the violation. 2
D.

The Public-Injury Doctrine

At least one line of Supreme Court cases appears at first blush
inconsistent with my. analysis of antitrust injury: the one limiting
the requirement that the plaintiff allege injury to the public.8 The
"public injury" doctrine, as enunciated by the lower courts, had in
effect required that the plaintiff demonstrate with particularity
how the defendant's conduct had restrained trade." The Supreme
Court has held, however, that in cases of per se violations, an unreasonable restraint will be presumed, without any demonstration
of harm to the public. In Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas,
Light, & Coke Co.,8 5 for example, the Court said: "[t]o state a
claim on which relief can be granted under [section 1], allegations
adequate to show a violation and, in a private treble damage action, that plaintiff was damaged thereby are all the law requires." 86
Nothing in this line of cases is inconsistent with the requirement of antitrust injury. To say that the plaintiff need not show
public injury in per se cases to establish the fact of a violation does
not tell us what kind of individual injury should be compensable;
'2 But see Klein v. American Luggage Works, Inc., 206 F. Supp. 924, 945-48 (D.Del.
1962), rev'd on other grounds, 323 F.2d 787 (3d Cir. 1963).
8' Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962); In re
McConnell, 370 U.S. 230 (1962); Poller Co. v. CBS, Inc., 368 U.S. 464 (1962); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961); Klor's, Inc. v. BroadwayHale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445
(1957).
See, e.g., Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil Ref. Co., 214 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1954);
Fedderson Motors, Inc. v. Ward, 180 F.2d 519 (10th Cir. 1950).
85 364 U.S. 656 (1961).
81 Id. at 660. Subsequent cases in lower courts have held, however, that the plaintiff is
still required to allege public injury-in the sense of conduct that unreasonably restrains
trade-in cases that do not fall into the per se category. E.g., Kestenbaum v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 514 F.2d 690, 699-700 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976); Lamb
Enterprises, Inc. v. Toledo Blade Co., 461 F.2d 506, 517-18 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1001 (1972); Arthur Murray, Inc. v. Reserve Plan, Inc., 406 F.2d 1138, 1145 (8th Cir. 1969);
Juneau Square Corp. v. First Wis. Nat'l Bank, 435 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D. Wis. 1977). But see
Syracuse Broadcasting Corp. v. Newhouse, 295 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1961).
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in a different context, that was the very point made by Brunswick.
The inquiry into antitrust injury addresses the question of damages and does not even begin until the court finds that a violation
has been alleged and that the plaintiff has been injured by it. The
purpose of the inquiry is to determine whether and to what extent
the plaintiff's injury flows from the kind of inefficiency to which
the substantive law is directed.
IV. THE APPLICATIONS OF ANTITRUST INJURY
We have seen that the concept of antitrust injury precludes
recovery for injury caused by conduct that does not reduce allocative efficiency, but permits recovery of losses brought about by a
curtailment of output through collusion or predatory conduct.
What remains is to consider how the concept will change the law
applicable to treble-damage actions. As this section will show, the
concept can be used to refine some previously accepted measures
of damages. The concept is also useful, however, in the treatment
of issues now considered under the rubric of standing or affirmative defenses. By identifying the effects that an offense has on efficiency, a court may determine from the pleadings or after discovery whether the harm to the plaintiff could have flowed from the
inefficiency.
A.

The Measure of Damages

Much of the secondary literature dealing with proof of antitrust damages has been concerned with the degree of certainty and
the kinds of evidence required to establish individual injury. 87 The
cases state the familiar proposition that a private plaintiff must
prove the "fact" of his injury with a greater degree of certainty
than its extent:
[T]here is a clear distinction between the measure of proof
necessary to establish the fact that petitioner had sustained
some damage and the measure of proof necessary to enable
the jury to fix the amount. The rule which precludes recovery
of uncertain damages applies to such as are not the certain
result of the wrong, not to those damages which are definitely
attributable to the wrong and only uncertain in respect of
67

E.g., E.

TIMBERLAKE, FEDERAL TREBLE DAMAGE ANTITRUST ACTIONS,

(1968); Guilfoil,

Damage Determinationin Private Antitrust Suits, 42 NOTRE DAME LAW. 647 (1967).
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their amount. 88
Antitrust injury, however, defines the kinds of damages that will
be compensable by identifying the aspects of antitrust violations to
which the plaintiff's injuries must be causally related. This qualificaton will necessarily affect the measure of damages in some cases,
as the following examples show.
1. Maximum Price Fixing. The implications of Brunswick
are most striking where a violation improves allocative efficiency
directly. Consider, for example, the damage award reached by the
lower courts after the Supreme Court's decision in Albrecht v. Herald Co.89 Although of doubtful validity after Sylvania,9 0 Albrecht
offers an illuminating example of the kinds of conflicts created by
the damage remedy. The plaintiff was a carrier to whom the defendant newspaper had given an exclusive route subject to maximum
resale prices. The plaintiff adhered to the price ceilings for a time,
but later began charging a higher price. In response, the defendant,
rather than terminate its agreement with the plaintiff, began to
compete against him. Through a telephone solicitation service, the
defendant drew away about one-quarter of the plaintiff's accounts
in an attempt to make him comply with the maximum price, and
appointed a temporary carrier to handle the accounts. When the
plaintiff sued, the defendant notified him that he would be terminated, and allowed him sixty days in which to sell the route.
The plaintiff failed in the lower courts, but the Supreme Court
reversed, finding an illegal combination among the defendant, the
agency that solicited the plaintiff's accounts, and the temporary
carrier. The Court reasoned that resale price fixing is illegal per se
whether the price fixed is a maximum or minimum, although different arrangements may have different effects. 1 Furthermore, the
exclusive territorial arrangement, although assumed to be legal for
the purposes of the litigation, did not justify the resale price fixing:
" Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562 (1931).
Accord, Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 114 & n.9 (1969).
"' 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
90 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). See Posner, The
Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U.
CHi. L. REv. 1, 12 (1977).
91 Minimum resale price maintenance may be an instrument of a dealers' cartel, or may
benefit the manufacturer by increasing retail promotional activities or by reinforcing a cartel of manufacturers. 390 U.S. at 151 n.7. But maximum price fixing, according to the Court,
"by substituting the perhaps erroneous judgment of a seller for the forces of a competitive
market, may severely intrude upon the ability of buyers to compete and survive in that
market." Id. at 152.
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"The assertion that illegal price fixing is justified because it blunts
the pernicious consequences of another distribution practice is
' 9' 2
unpersuasive.
After a retrial on the issue of damages, the jury returned special verdicts on damages for three types of losses: profits lost as a
result of the defendant's competition before the sale, the difference
between the fair market value of the plaintiff's route at the time of
the forced sale and the price actually received, and the plaintiff's
future profits.9 3 The court of appeals affirmed the award as to the
first two items of damage, but reversed the award of anticipated
profits, because the value of the future profits was included in the
9
fair market value of the business. 4
The damage issue was litigated on the understanding that, after the Supreme Court's ruling on liability, the defendant could no
longer "contest the fact that some damages would have to be
awarded by the jury,"9 5 and that all damages causally related to
the illegal conduct could be recovered. Brunswick suggests, however, that damages must be limited to the harm that flowed from
the anticompetitive aspects of the defendant's conduct. Under the
antitrust-injury approach, it was improper to award damages for
profits lost because of the defendant's competition. The plaintiff
was operating within an exclusive territory, with the consequent
capacity to increase price above marginal cost by restricting output.9 6 By its conduct, the defendant introduced new output into
the market at a lower price, at the same time drawing accounts
away from the plaintiff. There was no evidence that the defendant's prices were below cost or threatened the retailer's existence.
Similarly, the award of damages for the reduced value of the business was also improper, since the size of the reduction was based
upon capitalized profits attributable to the exclusive territorial arrangement. The plaintiff's loss of these profits is not the kind of
harm the antitrust laws were intended to prevent.
This conundrum illustrates once again the conflict created by
rigid rules of liability: although such rules may be necessary for

92

Id. at 154.

321 F. Supp. 99 (E.D. Mo. 1970), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 452 F.2d 124 (8th
Cir. 1971).
" 452 F.2d 124, 131 (8th Cir. 1971).
" Id.
at 127.
" If the newspaper is itself a monopolist, it will set its output at Q1 where its marginal
revenue (MR) equals its marginal cost (MC), resulting in a price to the carrier of P.
11
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reasons of judicial economy and certainty, they may encompass
clearly efficient conduct. The Court in Albrecht held that the existence of an exclusive territorial scheme did not justify an exception
to the per se prohibition of price fixing. It did not deny, however,
that conduct of the defendant designed to ensure adherence to the
maximum resale price would be efficient in light of the "pernicious
consequences" of the exclusive territories. The plaintiff should be
denied recovery in these circumstances, not because he has received offsetting benefits from the illegal arrangement,9 7 but because his harm flows from an increase in output; the defendant's
conduct has increased efficiency.
2. PredatoryPricing.There is a burgeoning academic literature on the subject of predatory pricing, most of it concerned with
how properly to define the offense. 8 Once a violation has been es-

P2
p,

MC

P

MR'

Q2

Q.

,Quantity

The market demand curve facing the carrier (D') reflects the wholesale demand curve (D)
plus the cost of distribution. The carrier's marginal cost then is P plus the cost of distribution, or MC' = P , . If the newspaper sets P, as its maximum (or if the retail level were
competitive), the output would be Q, at P. But if the carrier, because of its exclusive territory, sets its own monopoly price, it will set MC' equal to its own marginal revenue MR',
resulting in a lower output Q. and a higher price P2 .
9' See 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 3, 1 347, at 255-56. A plaintiff should
recover even if he has benefited from an illegal practice if the defendant's conduct reduces
industry output.
98 See, e.g., Areeda & Turner, supra note 68. The recent literature and case law are
surveyed in William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 461 F. Supp.
410 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
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tablished under one of the tests, however, the issue of which damages to treat as antitrust injury will remain. The principal inefficiency associated with successful predatory pricing is that it
increases the predator's market share, allowing it to restrict output. As noted above,9 9 the usual measure of damages for the exclusion of an existing competitor from the market is the discounted
value of its lost future profits as reflected in its going concern
value. This measure, I argued, is properly treated as antitrust injury, since it represents return on the output that the defendant
competitor has excluded from the market. There would seem to be
no reason why the same measure of damages should not apply
where predatory pricing results in the permanent exclusion of a
competitor.
A different problem is raised, however, if the plaintiff was not
excluded entirely, but incurred losses during the period of predation. As the Court said in Brunswick:
§ 4 plaintiffs [need not] prove an actual lessening of competition in order to recover. The short-term effect of certain anticompetitive behavior-predatory below-cost pricing, for example-may be to stimulate price competition. But
competitors may be able to prove antitrust injury before they
actually are driven from the market and the competition is
thereby lessened. Of course, the case for relief will be strongest where competition has been diminished.""
What should be the measure of antitrust injury in these circumstances? During the period of predation there is a social cost
imposed in maintaining output at levels higher than the product's
value to society would justify. The costs to the predator in employing this tactic are extremely high: he must expand output and suffer losses on all units sold during the period of predation. The
costs that the predator must bear are so high that some commentators doubt that a rational firm would ever use predatory pricing as
a method of exclusion; 10 ' at any rate, predatory pricing unquestionably imposes a substantial deterrent cost on the firm that tries
to use it, even apart from any prospective damage liability. These
costs must be considered when assessing damages, since the object
of a damage award is to impose a cost on the predator sufficient to
See text at note 76 supra.
429 U.S at 489 n.14 (citations omitted).
101 See, e.g., R. BORK, supra note 23, at 149-55.
100
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deter any inefficiency. The danger of overdeterrence is particularly
great in the imposition of penalties for reducing prices, a practice
that is often competitive and that, in the short term, directly benefits consumers.
10 2
In Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson ParchmentPaper Co.,
a case normally cited for its formulation of the degree of certainty
with which damages must be proven, the Supreme Court implicitly
recognized two measures of damages for injury caused by predatory pricing during the period of predation: the reduction in the
victim's going concern value'0 3 and the difference between the
predatory price and the price that the victim would otherwise have
received. 10 4 The first of these measures would seem to be antitrust
injury for the same reason that the loss in going concern value is
the proper measure of damages for total exclusion: it represents a
reduction in the profit-making potential of the firm and, as such, it
corresponds to output restriction that the predator expects to
make when he controls the market.
The Court's second measure of damage, however-the profit
that the victim loses on sales during the period of predation-should not be compensable. 0 5 This lost profit is simply a
wealth transfer to consumers, which, as we have seen, is not in itself inefficient. Unlike the overcharges in price fixing, this wealth
transfer does not directly benefit the defendant, and therefore is
not the inducement to engage in predatory pricing. Of course, the
lost profit is on sales made while industry output is inefficiently
high. But it is the predator, not the victim, that must expand its
production in order to maintain the market price below cost during
the period of predation; the cost of producing the marginal units
that increase industry output to inefficient levels is borne by the
predator. Therefore the victim's lost profits during this period do
not flow from the inefficiency. To allow them as damages, in addition to any reduction in going concern value, would be overdeterrence in an area where overdeterrence is particularly harmful.
3. Foreclosure.A more complex issue is presented by vertical
associations such as mergers, tying arrangements, or exclusive
dealing contracts that allegedly "foreclose" competing sellers from
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282 U.S. 555 (1931).

103
104

Id. at 561-68.
Id. at 561-66.

105

See Murphy Tugboat Co. v. Crowley, 454 F. Supp. 847, 853-57 (N.D. Cal. 1978). But

see 2 P. AREEDA & D.

TURNER,

supra note 3, 1 344, at 231.
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all or part of the market. The Court in Brunswick indicated obliquely that different considerations would apply in foreclosure
cases; "the case for relief will be strongest where competiton has
been diminished," the Court noted, citing two damage cases involving foreclosure. 1°6 As the Court implied, foreclosure is distinguishable from coercive exclusionary practices such as predatory
pricing in that the former entirely eliminates rivalry in the supply
of a product to a particular purchaser. But it is clear that such
rivalry is not necessarily the same thing as overall competition.
Since every contract or acquisition forecloses all but the contracting supplier from providing goods to the business affected, efficiency of distribution
requires a degree of foreclosure, in the gen10 7
eral sense.

The courts have adopted in practice, if not in words, a presumption that foreclosure of a substantial percentage of the market by a merger, tying arrangement, or exclusive dealing contract,
is illegal, regardless of the arrangement's actual competitive effects.108 The real object of this approach, however, should not be to
prevent foreclosure in itself but the possible inefficient result of
foreclosure, that is, an increase in monopoly power. Foreclosure
may provide a judicial yardstick by which to administer the competitive standard consistently; foreclosure does not, however, reflect an actual reduction in competition in any meaningful sense.
This distinction is important in the substantive law, and crucial to
determining the appropriate measure of damages. The only accurate gauge of whether competition is reduced by foreclosure is the
effect of the arrangement on industry output.
It therefore does not follow that every sale lost by a foreclosed
rival because of the defendant's conduct represents antitrust injury. Yet that fallacy in the measure of damages was adopted by
the court in Richfield Oil Corp. v. Karseal Corp.10 9 Karseal was
foreclosed from selling its automobile wax through the defendant's
service stations as a result of the defendant's requirement that its
dealers carry only a competing brand of wax. In its claim for damages, Karseal noted that its wax sold three times better than the
competing wax in the market as a whole. Thus, Karseal argued
106429 U.S. at 489 n.14 (citing Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 532 F.2d
674 (9th Cir. 1976); Metric Hosiery Co. v. Spartans Indus., Inc., 50 F.R.D. 50 (S.D.N.Y.
1970)).
107 See ECONOMIC PERSPECTIvE, supra note 23, at 196.
108 See note 68 supra.
10 271 F.2d 709 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 961 (1960).
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that if its product, instead of the competing brand, had been sold
at the service stations, sales would have been three times greater.
The court therefore awarded as damages Karseal's usual profit per
case multiplied by these "lost sales." This measure did not, however, reflect antitrust injury, since it was unrelated to the effect of
the restraint on output. The court assumed that the sales Karseal
lost from the foreclosure were not or could not have been made by
sales through other outlets. Since the foreclosed seller should be
required to mitigate his damages, however, he should be required
to seek alternative outlets; the mere fact that Karseal's product
was not sold through one chain of outlets says little about the effect of the restraint on the product's sales in general. Yet Karseal
offered no evidence that the consumers who supposedly would
have purchased its product through the defendant's stations did
not purchase it through other outlets in spite of the foreclosure.
Thus, at the very least, damages should be limited to the effect of the foreclosure on the defendant's overall sales. This was
the principle adopted by the Court in 2361 State Corp. v. Sealy,
Inc.,110 in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. In that case,
a bedding manufacturer was foreclosed from selling to one of its
retail accounts by an exclusive dealing contract between a competitor and the account. But the manufacturer was allowed damages
only to the extent that its business as a whole was injured, not for
profit lost on sales to the contracting outlet viewed independently.
Although the overall-sales measure will preclude an award of
damages in cases in which the foreclosure has no effect on the competitor's overall sales, it may overstate the injury when the defendant seller increases his output at the expense of its rival, but
leaves industry output unaffected. In these circumstances, the reduction in the plaintiff's sales does not represent a reduction in
industry output and should not form the basis of a damage recovery. The sales lost to the defendant would represent antitrust injury only if the vertical arrangement were used as a form of predation-that is, if it were accompanied by an increase in output
through sales below cost. Foreclosure that reduced industry output
or that was predatory would be deterred; but foreclosure with only
an incipient effect on output, product quality, and so forth would
110263 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. Ill. 1967). See also Elder-Beerman Stores Corp. v. Federated
Dep't Stores, Inc., 459 F.2d 138, 148 (6th Cir. 1972); Haden Co. v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp., 459 F. Supp. 1250, 1258 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
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be remedied by injunctive relief.111
B. Antitrust Injury and Antitrust Standing
We have seen that conduct that violates the antitrust laws
may harm a single economic agent in a variety of ways, but that
the concept of antitrust injury limits the plaintiff's recoverable
damages to those flowing from the aspects of the violation that
cause inefficiencies. By the same logic, only those plaintiffs who are
harmed by the inefficiency-causing aspects of the conduct should
recover. Determining who those plaintiffs are is normally treated
as a question of standing, and the lower courts have, in fact, interpreted Brunswick as a standing case. 11 2 But antitrust standing
means more than the existence of antitrust injury to
the plain1
tiff,113 and it is useful to keep the concepts separate. "
Antitrust injury is a rule of standing in the broad sense insofar
as it defines the type of harm that is compensable; all of those
plaintiffs who have not suffered this kind of harm necessarily lack
standing to sue. The antitrust standing doctrine, however, narrows
the class of those who may recover for antitrust injury. Within this
scheme, antitrust injury defines that level of damages appropriate
for carrying out the deterrent function. The rules of standing reinforce the deterrent function by preventing multiple recoveries or
excessively complex or numerous lawsuits: the goal of deterrence
would be just as certainly undermined by duplicative recoveries as
it would be by recoveries for harms unrelated to the inefficiency
caused by the violation. A damage award unrelated to the size of
the injury increases the total social cost of antitrust enforcement." 5
11 For an analysis of damages where foreclosure by a tying arrangement is the basis of
a suit by a purchaser, see note 135 infra.
"2 See, e.g., John Lenore & Co. v. Olympia Brewing Co., 550 F.2d 495, 498-99 (9th Cir.
1977); Juneau Square Corp. v. First Wis. Nat'l Bank, 445 F. Supp. 965, 969-70 (E.D. Wis.

1978).
11" See generally 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 3, 1 333-43; Berger & Bernstein, An Analytical Framework for Antitrust Standing, 86 YALE L.J. 809 (1977); Sherman,
Antitrust Standing: From Loeb to Malamud, 51 N.Y.U.L. REv. 374 (1976); Lytle & Purdue,
Antitrust Target Area Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 25 AM. U.L. REV. 795 (1976);
Note, Standing to Sue for Treble Damages Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 64 COLUM.

L. REv. 570 (1964).
Il See Berger & Bernstein, supra note 113, at 835-38; Handler, Changing Trends in

Antitrust Doctrines: An Unprecedented Supreme Court Term-1977, 77 COLUM. L. REv.
979, 996-97 (1977).
115 See generally Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation,Deterrence, and Con-
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Since we are concerned here with the proper scope of antitrust
injury, we need not resolve how to determine in every case which
plaintiffs should be denied standing because of the danger of multiple recovery or excessively complex litigation. As we shall see,
however, correctly identifying the antitrust injury caused by a restraint would dispose of a range of cases now mistakenly viewed as
ones of antitrust standing, and would simplify the legitimate questions of standing.
Courts have normally denied standing, for example, to employees dismissed as a result of their employers' antitrust violations. In Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,11 an employee who was
dismissed after a merger was denied damages because his injury
was not proximately caused by the violation. Although the Court
characterized the issue as one of standing, the language used by
the Court suggests that the inquiry was closer to one of antitrust
injury: the plaintiff's injury was "the natural effect flowing from
two similarly structured businesses combining their assets to maximize efficiency," and "not a result of any lessening of commercial
competition."11 7 In other words, the harm to the plaintiff resulted
from an increase in productive efficiency rather than from an output restriction.1 1 8
The concept of antitrust injury also supports the court's result
in Kiriharav. Bendix Corp.11 9 In that case, the plaintiff's exclusive
distributorship was terminated, and another distributor was substituted, pursuant to a merger. The court denied relief on the
ground that the plaintiff was not within the class of plaintiffs the
statute was intended to protect and therefore lacked standing. But
an antitrust-injury analysis leads to the same result: the substitution of one exclusive distributor for another can have no effect on
industry output. The plaintiff's injuries stemmed solely from the
suppliers' efforts to increase productive efficiency.
There are other cases in which a determination of antitrust
injury would obviate the need for standing analysis. Thus, a plaintiff whose competitors are engaged in a price-fixing 2 0 or marketflict of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL

STUD.

47 (1975).

1"6 471 F.2d 727 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 938 (1973).
17 Id.
at 731 (quoting Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc. 193 F.2d 51 (9th Cir.
1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952)).
11 See also Tugboat, Inc. v. Mobile Towing Co., 534 F.2d 1172, 1176 (5th Cir. 1976);
Mans v. Sunray DX Oil Co., 352 F. Supp. 1095 (N.D. Okla. 1971).
119 306 F. Supp. 72 (D. Hawaii 1969).
120 See Kemp Pontiac-Cadillac, Inc. v. Hartford Auto. Dealers' Ass'n, Inc., 380 F. Supp.
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allocation scheme 121 should not recover damages, unless the
scheme involves the setting of a predatory price or the exclusion of
the plaintiff from the market.122 If price is raised above cost and

the plaintiff is not prevented from reaching the market, he should
not recover, since he may avoid any injury-or, indeed, benefit
from the restraint-by setting a competitive price himself. Similarly, if a manufacturer adopts an exclusive territorial scheme to
distribute his product, his competitors cannot suffer antitrust injury as a result. 123 Such an arrangement, insulating the distributors
from intrabrand competition, is intended to encourage the distributors to increase their promotional activities and thereby to increase demand for the manufacturer's product. If the arrangement
is unsuccessful, the distributors will sell less; although competition
would be reduced in that event, the competitors would not be
damaged at all. If, however, the arrangement is successful and the
distributors' additional services increase demand for the manufacturer's product, the competitors may suffer injury-but not antitrust injury. As in Brunswick, the competitors' losses are the result
of an increase in competition.
Antitrust injury has a further implication in the standing context that is not so obvious. Plaintiffs may argue that the elimination of competition has harmed them by causing destructive externalities in production-by causing physical as opposed to
pecuniary damages. Plaintiffs have argued, for example, that an
agreement restricting the production of antipollution devices
harmed them by increasing environmental damage.1 24 While it is

plausible to suggest that a restriction in the output of preventive
devices would cause an increase in whatever physical harm the devices were designed to avoid, these externalities should not lead to
an award of antitrust damages.1 25 The concern of antitrust policy is
with pecuniary harms brought about through distortions in the
price mechanism; antitrust injury, likewise, should be limited to
1382 (D. Conn. 1974).
21 See Bowen v. New York News, Inc., 522 F.2d 1242, 1255-56 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 936 (1976).
122 See generally Juneau Square Corp. v. First Wis. Nat'l Bank, 445 F. Supp. 965 (E.D.
Wis. 1978).
M See Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. 384, 401-02 (D. Del. 1978) (section 1 of the Sherman Act).
124 In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1045 (1973).
"2' See generally R. BORK, supra note 23, at 114-15.
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these kinds of harms. 12 6 Furthermore, for practical reasons, it
would be impossible to separate in an antitrust case which physical
harms were caused by the reduction in competition, and which by
other factors. These kinds of external diseconomies are more properly viewed as lying within the scope of environmental law or the
law of torts.
Thus, a large number of cases typically treated as ones of antitrust standing can be disposed of by determining whether antitrust
injury has been caused by the practice at issue. There remain
cases, however, in which the injury to the plaintiff does flow from
the anticompetitive aspect of the violation, but in which standing
should be denied for other policy reasons.
One of the more ambitious scholarly attempts to develop a
comprehensive approach to the standing issue argues that courts,
in determining standing to sue, should balance a number of competing policies-those, for example, in favor of compensation and
1
deterrence and those against "ruinous" or multiple recoveries. 27
Our analysis suggests that the inquiry should be a good deal narrower. The concept of antitrust injury defines the kinds of harms
that should be compensable in order to maintain the efficient level
of deterrence. The function of antitrust standing should be complementary: to limit recovery to the plaintiff or class of plaintiffs
who are in the best position to impose the deterrent penalty on the
defendant. Under notions of standing, potentially duplicative recoveries should be barred and the full right of action given to the
plaintiff in the best evidentiary position to recover. But standing
should not be denied on the ground that an award of damages for
antitrust injury would be "ruinous." If the award is not duplicative, then there is no justification for not imposing the full deter128
rent penalty.

C. Affirmative Defenses and Antitrust Injury
In Perma Life Mufflers v. InternationalParts Co.,1 29 the Supreme Court held that the equitable doctrine of in pari delicto is
not an absolute bar to recovery in antitrust cases. Lower courts,
128

Cf. NAACP v. New York Clearing House Ass'n, 431 F. Supp. 405, 411 (S.D.N.Y.

1977) (racial or sexual discrimination not antitrust injury).
127 Berger-& Bernstein, supra note 113.
128 But see Mid-West Paper Prods. Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 587
(3d Cir. 1979).
129 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
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however, have interpreted the various opinions in Perma Life to
permit the denial of recovery where the parties to the suit are
equally at fault.1 30 My argument so far suggests that fault should
not be the controlling criterion. The elimination of in pari delicto
may be criticized for creating an incentive to engage in antitrust
violations by assuring violators that if their plan turns out badly
they can always sue their fellow wrongdoers for treble damages.
But this, of course, ignores the other side of the coin: eliminating
the absolute bar simultaneously deters the same persons by the
threat that they, too, may be sued by their coconspirators. In some
circumstances, a bar based upon in pari delicto could actually deter efficient conduct. Consider, for example, a dealer cartel that
has induced a manufacturer to impose resale price maintenance. If
one of the cartel members is terminated by the manufacturer for
shading on price, he should be permitted to recover the going concern value of his business.1 3 Although by cutting price he has attempted to increase his share of the excess profit created by the
cartel, 13 2 his termination was nonetheless inefficient because it prevented an increase in industry output that would have weakened
the cartel.
The concerns that underlie in pari delicto are, of course, legitimate, but they are often served equally well by permitting recovery
only for antitrust injury. If a practice results in no present inefficiency, for example, then those injured by it should not recover,
whether or not they participated in the scheme. In Dreibus v. Wilson,"" the officers of an exclusive distributorship succeeded in obtaining for themselves a new exclusive distributorship in the same
product. The Court denied recovery in a suit by the owners of the
first distributorship on the grounds that they were deeply involved
in the illegal act. The same result follows, however, from an antitrust-injury analysis. 3 4 The substitution of one exclusive distribu1" See generally Note, In PariDelicto and the Deterrence of Antitrust Violations, 62
MINN. L. Rav. 59 (1977); Note, A Re-Examination of In Pari Delicto Under the Antitrust

Laws, 19 B.C.L. REv. 207 (1977).
1 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 295 F. 98, 102 (5th Cir.
1923), af'd, 273 U.S. 359 (1927).
1" See ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE, supra note 23, at 12.
"'
529 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1975).
"s The court of appeals recognized this implicitly when it quoted with approval from
the district court opinion: "The replacement of Velvet as a distributor could not worsen the
competitive structure of the alleged market. A monopoly existed before the change; at worst,
a monopoly existed afterwards." 529 F.2d at 174 (quoting unpublished district court opinion, at 5-7).
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torship for another created no new inefficiency. The plaintiff's injuries should not be compensable because they did not result from
any inefficiency brought about by the defendants' actions, rather
than because the plaintiffs were as much at fault as the
defendants.13 5
The plaintiff's own anticompetitive conduct should also in
some cases determine whether the harm to it constitutes antitrust
injury. This possibility is illustrated by Keifer-Stewart, Inc. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc.,"5 6 a decision that (although technically concerned with the doctrine of "unclean hands" rather than
in pari delicto) anticipated Perma Life in many respects. The
plaintiff, a liquor wholesaler, claimed that the defendants collusively refused to deal with it unless it agreed to resell at a fixed
maximum price. Although the defendants had offered evidence
that the plaintiff was itself a member of a retail cartel, the Court
found that the trial court had correctly instructed the jury that the
plaintiff's conduct was not a defense. While the plaintiff's participation in a cartel did not estop it from challenging the defendant's
antitrust violations, it was relevant to the issue of antitrust injury.
If the retail price was collusively raised above the competitive
level, then the defendant's maximum price increased output; to the
extent the plaintiff should not recover the profits it lost as a result
236 Professor Areeda has argued on similar grounds that purchasers of products under
illegal tie-in sales should normally not recover the full "overcharge" on the tied product as
damages. Areeda, supra note 9, at 1136-38. See also 2 P. ARFEDA & D. TURNER, supra note
3, 347. If the illegal tie is of products sold in fixed proportions, the purchaser is simply not
injured: he would not have purchased the tied product at a supracompetitive price unless he
was compensated by the seller with a reduction in the price of the tying product. Thus,
Areeda argues (on the basis of certain language in Perma Life) that the seller should be
allowed to set off the benefits that the purchaser derives from the contract in determining
*damages. If, on the other hand, the tie is declared illegal on the grounds of price discrimination-that is, if the tied product is sold in variable proportions according to the intensity
with which the buyer uses the tying product-then there is still no injury to the purchaser.
Although he may pay a higher price for the tied products, the seller could extract the same
amount without the tie by directly metering the buyer's use of the tying product and charging a proportionate price for it. As Areeda points out, courts have recognized the propriety
of varying the price of a product according to the intensity with which it is used; and if the
same amount may be extracted by a less restrictive, and, therefore, legal means, then the
damages are not actually caused by the illegal tie-in per se. Although phrased in terms of
the "inherently offsetting" character of the injuries, both of Areeda's arguments are, at bottom, based on antitrust injury. In each case, since there is no restriction of production, the
plaintiff incurs no damage that flows from inefficiency. The same reasoning could be applied
to eliminate damages in the cases of exclusive dealing contracts and "noncoercive" reciprocity. For example, Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster, 451 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971) is a case
involving "noncoercive" reciprocity, to which the foregoing analysis could be applied.
136 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
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of the defendant's refusal to deal. The fact that the plaintiff was
denied cartel profits is no concern of the antitrust laws. 37
Thus, while in pari delicto should be discarded as a complete
defense, its underlying rationale should be retained as a rule of
damages. The goal of deterrence will be more completely achieved
by limiting damages to antitrust injury than by the blunt instrument of a rule of estoppel based on fault.
CONCLUSION

The most trenchant recent criticism of substantive antitrust
policy is that it reduces competition by restricting efficient business arrangements.138 But much of the expansion of antitrust liability over the last twenty years has resulted from a recognition
that it is often difficult in an adversary system to prove what effects a given practice has on competition. The courts have therefore been willing to defer to the expertise of enforcement agencies,
rather than to adopt a uniform rule of reason in antitrust cases.
The resulting rules, although not anticompetitive in their purpose, often are so in their practical effect, as the lower court's result in Albrecht demonstrates. Per se rules of liability can only be
justified on grounds that they lighten the plaintiff's burden if the
prospective plaintiff can be relied upon to weigh costs and benefits
in its choice of cases. Since rigid rules necessarily cover a range of
efficient conduct, the most significant cost to be considered in determining the optimal level of enforcement is the inefficiency the
suit may produce. Although there are some random, even perverse,
elements in the criteria for case selection by the Department of
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, 3 9 those organizations
have no clear incentive to bring anticompetitive cases, and seem to
consider the efficiency consequences of their enforcement policies.1 40 The same cannot be said of private plaintiffs, who not only
137 See Kestenbaum v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 575 F.2d 564, 569-70 (5th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979).
138 See R. BORK, supra note 23, passim.
138 See Asch, The Determinantsand Effects of Antitrust Activity, 18 J. LAW & ECON.
575 (1975); Long, Schram & Tollison, The Economic Determinantsof Antitrust Activity, 16
J. LAW & ECON. 351 (1973); Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 47
(1969); Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J. LAW & ECON. 965
(1970); Siegfried, The Determinants of Antitrust Activity, 18 J. LAW & ECoN. 559 (1975).
But see Masson & Reynolds, Statistical Studies of Antitrust Enforcement: A Critique,in
AMERICAN STATISTICAL ASS'N, 1977 PROCEEDINGS OF THE BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC STATISTICS
SECTION (Part I) 22.
140 Address by Joel Davidow, "Policy Planning at the Antitrust Division," Intensified
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have the incentive to bring any case that holds out the prospect of
treble damages, but frequently find it in their interest to prevent
efficient conduct. If the damage provision's intended purpose of
harnessing the self-interest of injured individuals to promote a policy of fostering efficiency is to be fulfilled, damages should be
awarded in a way consistent with that policy. The concept of antitrust injury, whether viewed as a rule of standing or a measure of
damages, helps serve this function by awarding damages only when
the harm flows from the anticompetitive aspect of the violation.
Since the aim of competition-and of antitrust policy-is to
achieve an efficient allocation of resources, a plaintiff should not be
permitted to recover for the injury from an antitrust violation that
does not foster inefficiency.

Course in Antitrust Law (Ohio Legal Center Institute, Columbus, Ohio) (June 16, 1978).

